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 This essay introduces the subject of this special issue by offering a 
characterization of analytic feminism in terms of its context, methods, and problem 
areas.  I argue that analytic feminism is a legitimate subfield both of feminism and of 
analytic philosophy.  I then summarize the problems addressed by the essays of this 
issue. 
 The purpose of this issue of Hypatia is to highlight the work of analytic feminists, 
to demonstrate that feminist analytic philosophy (or analytic feminist philosophy) exists 
and merits consideration both by feminist philosophers working in other traditions and 
by other analytic philosophers who have not yet examined, or who have rejected, 
feminist philosophy.  It is, we hope, an exercise in bridge-building, not fence-building.  
The idea for this special issue arose at about the same time that similar projects were 
getting under way in other forums.  In early 1991, Virginia Klenk, my co-editor for this 
issue, sent out an inquiry to philosophers who she thought might be interested in (but 
not necessarily agree with any particular tenets of) the intersection of analytic 
philosophy and feminism.  The result was the formation of the Society for Analytical 
Feminism, which now meets at American Philosophical Association (APA) conventions 
and provides a forum for analytic feminism.  Meanwhile, Louise Antony and Charlotte 
Witt were putting together their anthology, A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on 
Reason and Objectivity, a book that has a preponderance of essays in what we would 
call analytic feminism, and whose expressed aim was similar to ours here.  Last 
summer Susan Haack was the guest editor of an issue of the Monist on the topic of 
"Feminist Epistemology: For and Against" (see the essay by Lynn Hankinson Nelson in 
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the present issue for an interesting critique of the aims of that issue).  It was, it seemed, 
(and still does), an idea whose time had come.   
 Nonetheless, many philosophers to whom I pitched the idea for this issue had 
some initial concerns.  First, some asked, isn't analytic feminism well-trodden ground, 
since most of the early feminist philosophers were trained in analytic philosophy?  
Second, is analytic philosophy even compatible with feminism, or is "analytic feminism" 
really just a masquerade for a backlash against feminism and, hence, likely to be more 
a source of conflict, or worse, for feminists?  More fundamentally, is analytic feminism a 
recognizable body of work, a legitimate category of philosophy, at all?  To begin, then, I 
would like to respond to these concerns. 
 Although many feminist philosophers who began writing about feminism in the 
sixties and early seventies, such as Marilyn Frye, Ann Garry, Sandra Harding, Alison 
Jaggar, and Joyce Trebilcot (this is no attempt at a comprehensive list), were trained in 
analytic philosophy, they began to question that tradition in the process of clearing 
ground institutionally and theoretically for feminism in philosophy.  Eventually many of 
them gave up trying to work within the analytic tradition and began to reject the authors 
and even the problems and concepts that sustain that tradition.  Feminist philosophy is 
now a legitimate field of philosophical research, and there now exist institutional 
structures that nurture feminists and women in philosophy, such as the Society for 
Women in Philosophy (SWIP), the APA Committee on the Status of Women, this 
journal, and the SWIP-l on the Internet.  One can even get an NEH grant for research 
on feminist issues in philosophy.  Not to overstate things or suggest that we are home 
free, we must acknowledge that the first wave of feminist philosophers has been 
enormously successful in staking a claim to institutional territory and theoretical 
significance.  Still, much philosophical work remains to be done.  Many of us believe 
that it is important now to re-engage the analytic methods, problems, concepts, and 
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authors that attracted us in the first place and to see how they might be put to feminist 
uses and, likewise, to see how philosophical feminism can illuminate issues in 
philosophy that we might have thought unrelated to feminist concerns.  Although 
feminist philosophy originated at least partly in analytic philosophy, it is especially 
valuable now to re-examine analytic concepts and methods with the extensive 
background of philosophical feminism we have since developed. 
 When I conceived this special issue of Hypatia I knew that eventually I would 
have to characterize analytic feminist philosophy in some detail.  Try as I might, I 
cannot give necessary and sufficient conditions for what counts as a piece of analytic 
feminism.  But analytic philosophers can be quite satisfied with noting the family 
resemblances between instances of a concept, and this is perhaps all that is possible in 
this case.   As I have suggested, a philosophical approach distinguishes itself by its 
problems, methods, and the tradition of canonical works on which it draws.  Feminists 
in the analytic tradition, like analytic philosophers more generally, value clarity and 
precision in argument and use logical and linguistic analysis to help them achieve that 
clarity and precision.  They draw on a canon of traditional work that is common through 
the nineteenth century with most Western philosophical traditions.  The analytic canon 
then takes a decisive turn away from France and Germany, and toward England (with a 
keen interest in what was going on in Vienna in the early part of this century) and, later, 
the United States and Canada. 
 Analytic feminists distinguish themselves from nonfeminists by an interest in a 
wider variety of works by feminists: works that draw on other traditions in philosophy as 
well as work by feminists working in other disciplines, especially the social and 
biological sciences.  Most important, analytic feminist work is characterized by the 
conviction that there is value in the pursuit of notions of truth, logical consistency, 
objectivity, rationality, justice, and the good, despite the fact that the pursuit of these 
 Analytic Feminism Introduction - page 4 
 
notions has often been dominated and perverted by androcentrism.  But unlike 
nonfeminists, analytic feminists insist on seeing how sexism, androcentrism, and the 
domination of the profession of philosophy by men distorts philosophers' pursuit of truth 
and objectivity.  Analytic feminism often attempts to reclaim these notions from 
androcentric biases: to find what is epistemically compelling in these concepts and what 
is morally good in their application and to separate that from the sexist baggage that 
has traditionally accompanied them.  Some analytic feminists (and this has been the 
focus of much of my own work) argue that, properly analyzed, these concepts can be 
used to undermine androcentrism or unjust gendered social institutions.    
 Analytic feminists share the conviction that the social constructions of gender 
create a fundamentally unjust imbalance in contemporary social and political 
arrangements.  But no further political generalization can be made about us.  Some 
analytic feminists fit Alison Jaggar's description of the liberal feminist, but others reject 
liberalism and consider themselves to be politically socialist or radical.  Analytic 
feminists run the gamut of political views from libertarians to liberals to socialists to 
radicals.  Analytic feminism is not to be confused with some sort of conservative 
feminism, or worse, a backlash against political or academic feminism.  Perhaps the 
only social or political position that analytic feminists can be said generally to take is that 
there is a sex/gender distinction, though they may disagree widely on how this 
distinction is to be drawn and what moral or political implications it has. 
 Among those who are skeptical of analytic feminism there is also a deep concern 
about its viability; some charge that analytic feminism is an oxymoron.  (I might note 
that this charge comes from philosophers hostile to feminism as well as feminists hostile 
to analytic philosophy, though this is not the place to respond to the former.)  In recent 
years, analytic methods and traditional issues and authors in many fields have come 
under attack by feminist intellectuals.  Regarding philosophy, they charge (in various 
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ways) that the notions of reason, truth, objectivity, or the methods of logical and 
linguistic analysis are hopelessly masculinist, and cannot be reclaimed for feminist 
purposes.  Many canonical philosophers, including Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, 
Rousseau, Frege, Quine, and Rawls, have been criticized as sexist or at least 
androcentric, and are said by some to have nothing useful to say to women.  These 
charges pose a serious dilemma for feminist philosophers who have been trained in the 
analytic tradition and who find that tradition valuable.  Analytic feminists tend to make 
the following kinds of responses.   While it is true that there are sexists who are 
analytic philosophers, this is no less true of postmodern and Continental philosophy.  
(Hegel, it may be argued, is among the most explicitly sexist philosophers in any canon, 
after all.)  So, if we were to reject philosophers on those grounds we would have to 
reject almost the entire history of philosophy.  But the real question is whether their 
ideas can be corrected and rescued by an enlightened critical reader.  There is in any 
case a value in exploring how one can turn the weapons of the oppressor against the 
oppressor.  Further, many traditional philosophical notions are not only normatively 
compelling, but are in some ways empowering and liberating for women.  Louise 
Antony's discussion of the "bias paradox" makes this clear; more generally, if we want 
to reject a view because it is false/oppressive/unjust to women, then we need some 
rational, objective ground from which we can argue that it is in fact 
false/oppressive/unjust to women.  Thus, analytic feminists have begun (in a second 
wave) to explore the connections between feminism and traditional problems in analytic 
philosophy, and to examine the history of philosophy with the critiques of androcentrism 
and sexism in the tradition in mind, at the same time maintaining a clear sense of the 
need for defensible notions of truth and objectivity.   
 Last, our response to the skeptics must be simply that the proof of the pudding is 
in the eating: let's see what you think when you have digested these articles.  Are they 
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politically or morally retrograde, or are they, as Ann Garry argues, at least minimally 
decent?  Do they advance the debate over philosophical issues of importance to 
feminism?  Do they advance debates in analytic philosophy by making good use of 
feminist analyses?  The editors of this issue feel that the essays here, as well as other 
writings of feminists in the analytic tradition, should make it abundantly clear, if there 
was ever a real question, that feminism and analytic philosophy are not only compatible 
but are often symbiotic.  Analytic philosophy can make significant contributions to 
feminism, and it can also be greatly illuminated by feminist perspectives. 
 The articles in this issue focus on the methods and problems of analytic 
feminism, leaving debates about particular figures in the canon to other occasions.  
Two essays might be best classified as focusing on the methodology of analytic 
philosophy.  Ann Garry proposes to "take a fresh look at the relation between feminist 
philosophy and analytic philosophy" to ask whether analytic feminism can offer, in the 
words of her title, "A Minimally Decent Philosophical Method?"  We believe that you will 
find her essay thoughtful and provocative, (perhaps painfully) honest, and ultimately 
ambivalent.  Lynn Hankinson Nelson discusses the charge that feminist epistemology 
or feminist science is "incongruous," a charge that she notes comes from both the left 
and right flanks, one might say.  She argues that this incongruity is only apparent and 
that there is a place for feminist epistemology within both philosophical feminism and 
mainstream epistemology, on any reasonable view. 
 The other six articles focus on particular themes of interest to analytic feminists.  
Reflecting the dominant trend in analytic philosophy generally, epistemology is 
discussed nearly to the exclusion of metaphysics, and these analytic feminists favor 
naturalized (and socialized) epistemology.  Elizabeth Anderson's "Feminist 
Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense" is sure to become a definitive piece, 
showing through numerous examples of actual feminist science just how a feminist 
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critique can inform and improve the objectivity of science.  She distinguishes and 
illustrates four ways that feminist critiques serve as a corrective to the distorted lenses 
of masculinist science: through the critique of gendered structures in the social 
organization of science, through the analysis of gendered symbols in scientific models,  
through exposing sexism in scientific practices and focusses, and through revealing 
androcentrism in its concepts and theories.  It is exactly the kind of work that one can 
use to counter the philosophical missourians in philosophy of science who demand that 
we show them just how the feminist critique makes a difference to the substance of 
scientific theories.   
 Two authors function as analytic underlaborers to existing feminist critiques of 
science.  Mark Owen Webb, in "Feminist Epistemology and the Extent of the Social," 
distinguishes and examines six ways that an epistemology can be socialized (on 
analogy with "naturalized" epistemology), engaging the work of three prominent feminist 
epistemologists to develop what he considers the proper formulation of socialized 
epistemology.   Geoffrey Gorham, in "The Concept of Truth in Feminist Sciences", 
argues for a particular concept of truth--"truthlikeness"--that he thinks fits well with the 
feminist critiques of science offered by feminist authors with such very differing views as 
Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, and Helen Longino.   
 One article is in moral epistemology.  Margaret Little's "Seeing and Caring: The 
Role of Affect in Feminist Epistemology" examines the epistemic role of caring in ethics, 
engaging the literature of analytic ethics, epistemology, and Aristotle studies.  In doing 
so she illustrates in moral philosophy two of the kinds of feminist critiques that Elizabeth 
Anderson described and illustrated in feminist science: identifying the androcentrism in 
supposing that typically male ways of seeing the moral are the only ones and identifying 
the sexism in then taking that way of seeing to be the primary virtue of moral 
epistemology.   
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 Finally, two essays take on feminists' criticisms of analytic philosophical concepts 
directly.  In "Feminism, Objectivity, and Analytic Philosophy," Sara Worley defends 
analytic epistemology against critiques by Susan Bordo and Evelyn Fox Keller, arguing 
that they show at most that men might tend to like analytic epistemology more than 
women do.  Although she agrees with the outlines of their critiques of "objectivity," she 
shows that analytic epistemology itself provides similar reasons to reject the view that 
knowledge is absolute and perspectiveless, and she argues that neither Bordo nor 
Keller have yet provided a viable alternative conception of objectivity.  Louise Antony's 
"Is Psychological Individualism a Piece of Ideology?" investigates the charge made by 
Naomi Scheman that psychological individualism is masculinist ideology that serves to 
maintain capitalism and patriarchy.  Antony distinguishes among several theses and 
defends the one--realism about individuals' beliefs and desires--that Scheman appears 
to attack.  In Antony's view, realism about objects is supported by theoretical necessity, 
and "the best theory of the mind entail[s] the existence of beliefs and desires."   Antony 
argues further that liberal political philosophy does not in any way depend on this thesis 
of psychological individualism; indeed, she shows that liberalism is compatible with 
psychological holism. 
 Finally, we include Julie Maybee's book review of Elizabeth Anderson's Value in 
Ethics and Economics.  This book is of special interest to feminists because of the 
applications Anderson makes of her novel theory of value in the book.  Maybee's 
remarks critically examine Anderson's claims about how her theory of value could be 
extended to treat racism. 
 In putting this issue together Virginia Klenk and I were assisted and advised by a 
number of persons whom we would like to acknowledge.  Our thanks go to Linda Lopez 
McAlister, who suggested this issue long ago at the first meeting of the Society for 
Analytical Feminism and guided us through every phase of the project.  I would like to 
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thank my colleagues Marcia Homiak and Cynthia Willett, who have been the very 
models of the analytic and the nonanalytic (you know who you are!) feminist 
philosophers, as well as my friends.  Marcia was especially helpful at the beginning of 
the project when I was writing the proposal and Cindy at the end as I write this 
introduction.  Our thanks also to Louise Antony, who was helpful in putting together the 
proposal for the issue.  The advisory board of Hypatia provided useful advice and 
criticism in their response to the proposal.  I thank the Department of Philosophy at the 
University of Kansas for support, and especially Cathy Schwartz and Kae Chatman for 
editorial assistance.   And finally I thank Neal Becker for taking on extra childcare 
duties, and I thank both him and Alex for their patience and loving support in this and 
other philosophical endeavors.  Virginia Klenk thanks Cammy Henry and Cheryl Stout 
for their help in managing correspondence and other clerical tasks for this project. 
